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Communication: Disconnect
Between Officials and Residents
A previous portion
of this ongoing project involved interviewing 100 Pascoag residents
from April 12 through May 1, 2002 to compile their thoughts, feelings,
and experiences regarding the water contamination. Building from
that base of research, the project was expanded during summer
2002 to interview official parties involved in the governmental
response to the contamination. The goal of this phase of the project
was to identify perceptions of officials and relate them to perceptions
of Pascoag residents.
We found that there are
several areas where perceptions of officials and residents regarding
each other's actions and motivations were drastically different.
We define these as areas of "disconnect."
Analysis of interview
data collected allowed us to break down this disconnect into several
main areas of contention. Data on resident perceptions comes
from the Spring 2002 portion of the study; data on officials comes
from interviews during Summer 2002. As will be discussed later,
these disconnects arise primarily from inadequate or non-existent
communication between these parties.
Areas of Disconnect:
How
this Disconnect Occurred
Other
Contributing Factors
How
this Disconnect May Have Altered Behavior
Responsibility
of Government
Residents: Residents generally felt that officials at
some level (either local, state, or both) dealt inadequately
with the contamination either by failing to prevent it from
happening or not providing sufficient aid once the problem
was discovered. Residents said that, initially, officials generally
should have been monitoring for this type of problem. Regarding
the official response to the problem, some residents said that their
local officials either couldn't deal with it or had their hands
tied. Many residents said that they were dissatisfied with the state
response, and that the state should have stepped in more
quickly and contributed more to helping to solve
the problem.
Officials: Local
officials' perceptions on this issue varied. Some indicated
that specific state agencies had the responsibility to do more than
they did, while others said that the responsibilities for dealing
with the problem were adequately met. State officials almost uniformly
perceived that the state through its involved agencies went above
and beyond its mandated duty in dealing with this situation. They
believed that this was a local problem and not within the purvey
of state authority, but that they provided massive amounts of assistance
despite their lack of true jurisdiction. Some state officials perceived
that residents incorrectly understood the extent of state responsibility
in the situation; some expressed frustration over the residents'
ingratitude towards those who had put so much time and effort into
the problem. This perception on the part of state officials could
also be related to the organizational culture of the various agencies.
The agencies involved perceive themselves as regulatory agencies,
whose role it is to tell the regulated body that something is wrong.
In this scenario, then, that regulated body would correct the problem,
not the regulator. In this case, the regulated bodies (the PUD and
the Main St. Mobil) were in no position to be able to deal with
this problem, and so the regulating agencies (HEALTH and DEM) had
to take a large role. Because of this underlying view of their duties,
officials then perceived their actions as well beyond what they
were required to do.
State
of emergency
Residents: Many residents strongly believed that the governor
should have declared a state of emergency. They thought that
had he done so the federal government would have become involved
and perhaps contributed resources and funding to getting the water
cleaned up faster. Moreover, the residents simply expressed that
5000 people without water constitutes an emergency. Since the contamination
manifested itself as an emergency to them, they wanted the governor
to recognize what they were going through and declare it an emergency.
Officials: During
the contamination, some local officials publicly called on Governor
Almond to declare a state of emergency. However, the vast majority
of the officials we spoke with during the summer confidently stated
that declaring a state of emergency would not have helped to
obtain for Pascoag any resources it wasn't already being given.
Some stated that they weren't sure, but that they thought that
no federal resources would have been forthcoming. Officials generally
perceived that this was an important point for the residents of
Pascoag. Some officials perceived that this was an area of disconnect,
and said that they had certainly not anticipated this. They said
that public confusion about this idea of a state of emergency spun
out of control before they could convey to residents why they had
chosen not to declare one. A source in the governor's office said
that the governor did not consider declaring a state of emergency
because no additional monies would have been gained and he would
not take an action unless it could achieve what it was meant to
achieve; for the governor, according to his office, this issue was
a matter of integrity.
Filters
Residents: The discussions over the possible installation
of a carbon filtration system on the wells to clean the water were
long and complicated. In the end, residents understood little
of the debate other than that there was a plan to put on a filter
which would have gotten them clean water, then the state rejected
the plan, then a temporary and less expensive filter was put on,
and then that filter didn't really work. Some residents were more
informed as to the progression of events, but some emphasized that
the state vetoed the plan.
Officials: Officials
presented a very different view of the filter system. Some wanted
to put on a filter, but never intended it to bring the contaminant
levels down to drinkable standards. Several officials indicated
that they were so concerned about residents' health that they could
not support the filter. Others conveyed that the filters were never
the final solution, just a stopgap measure that did not warrant
such a high initial investment.
Water Buffaloes
Residents: Residents viewed the water buffaloes (large tankers
owned by the National Guard that can be used to deliver water) as
one important way that they could get clean water in a more convenient
fashion. They wondered why the National Guard even keeps them, if
the Department of Health won't allow them to be used. Some understood
HEALTH's concerns and why the tanks were not used; others were just
angry. Residents believed that the water buffaloes would have
been a completely appropriate measure to provide them with water.
Officials: State
officials, on the other hand, truly believed that the water buffaloes
were a bad idea. They are very susceptible to bacterial contamination,
and so have to be cleaned out before each refilling. In addition,
they need to be guarded constantly against tampering. With these
factors, and the provisions of bottled water at the PUD and free
water at the Harrisville Fire House, HEALTH rejected the offer
of the water buffaloes on grounds of safety, cost, and convenience.
Officials noted that the residents wanted the water buffaloes; they
uniformly did not.
$400,000 in
EPA grant money
This is an issue on which no parties share the same perceptions
or understanding. The EPA approval to reallocate $400,000 from DEM's
Underground Storage Tank program from two previous EPA grants to
the Pascoag cleanup prompted many official parties to reach for
this money for a specific cleanup task. There were comments about
DEM's "hijacking" of the money, since Director Jan Reitsma
initially stated that not all of this grant would go to Pascoag
cleanup costs. Some officials believe that this was DEM's only funding
source for the entire cleanup, and now that it has been spent there
is nothing to cleanup another similar spill. (This is not true;
most costs were eventually paid by the UST Financial Responsibility
Fund Review Board, which comes from a $0.01 tax on every gallon
of gasoline bought in Rhode Island.) There are differing perceptions
as to what the $400,000 actually paid for, or if it was spent at
all.
Governor
Almond
Residents: The vast majority of residents were angry or upset
with the governor. There was a common sentiment that the governor
did not care about the well-being of Pascoag. Residents based
these perceptions on the fact that Governor Almond never came to
visit the village, and that he only issued a few statements about
the situation, the first one not until late October. One resident
said that the governor was "useless...impervious to our
needs and concerns. He never came to visit. I was completely unimpressed.
Basically, I was disgusted with him." The governor was
the state official residents mentioned by name most frequently and
with the most intensity.
Officials: A representative
from the governor's office indicated that the governor thought
that he had very good reasons for not visiting Pascoag. According
to this source, since officials from the state agencies charged
with dealing with the problem were working on it, the governor had
his best people there and there was no role for him. Regarding the
potential of a visit to Pascoag by the governor, this source said,
"I'm not sure what it does to go out there and say 'I feel
your pain' and now I'm going back to the state house and my home
where I have water."
Health
Concerns
Residents: Most residents cited health effects as their primary
concern regarding the contamination. Though we never asked directly
about any health problems, nearly every respondent brought up
health problems that they unquestioningly attributed to the contaminated
water. They expressed their concern with strong language and
emotions. Some of the things they mentioned included difficulty
breathing when exposed to water vapors in the shower, headaches,
vomiting, rashes, and an overriding concern for the health of their
children. In addition, many residents spoke about concern regarding
future health effects, especially cancer. Many expressed frustration
that HEALTH didn't seem to care about these effects or didn't seem
to know what to do or say about them, especially in public meetings
with HEALTH officials. They felt slighted by HEALTH officials' reactions
to their concerns.
Officials: HEALTH
officials point to the available literature on MTBE, which shows
no definitive links to any health effects. Their position is
that some of the health effects reported come from the stress associated
with the unpleasant taste and odor of MTBE and the emotional stress
of the contamination, but not as a health effect caused by the chemical
in the water. They know that residents see their symptoms as coming
from the water, and they do not believe that they can persuade them
otherwise.
Health
Tracking Study
Residents: Many of the residents we spoke with feel that
they are guinea pigs regarding MTBE's effects on the human body.
They want to be studied. They would like HEALTH or some other authority
to track their health over time, to assess if any later health
problems might arise from MTBE exposure. The residents who spoke
of this regarded it as a straightfoward matter, something HEALTH
could be expected to conduct.
Officials: Many
officials at HEALTH noted the difficulty of performing such a study
and the expense involved. They also noted the poor odds of such
a study revealing any definitive results, since it would be difficult
to attribute any later health effects solely to MTBE exposure.
No official seemed to consider this undertaking a likely possibility.
Speed
of Overall Response
Residents: Many residents wondered why it took over 4 months
for clean water to be flowing to their faucets again. They attributed
this slow response to lack of preparation or knowledge regarding
this type of problem, to lack of money, and to lack of caring on
the part of the state. Many perceived the length of time for
the resolution of the problem to be inordinately long.
Officials: Most
officials think that they were working as fast as they could, and
that not much could have been done to speed up the process.
Drilling a new well and creating an interconnection takes time,
as does installing a filter system and testing it. This perception
was shared by local and state officials. There seemed to be a serious
disconnect between the experiences of those living and working in
a community without potable water and the experiences of those living
and working through a regulatory and bureaucratic public health
and political system.
"If
it had happened in. . ."
Residents: The vast majority of residents believed that if
a similar contamination event had happened in a community with
different characteristics, the response of officials would have
been much different. The following are direct quotes from residents,
with each bullet representing a new speaker.
- "We felt like
we weren't an important town in the state. We felt like we didn't
even live in the state, we weren't part of the state, that's how
bad it was. Totally ignored."
- "We weren't
a big enough town to justify a state of emergency. All [the governor]
had to do was ask, and the Feds would have come in. It pisses
me off."
- "I just feel
the north-west corner of the state is always left out. I'm sure
if it was Lincoln something would have been done."
- "The big shots
in Providence don't care about us--we're a hick town."
- "They think
of us as blue-collar workers. I'm frustrated that the government
puts us down."
Officials: Officials
said that this perceived discrimination was just that. Some were
shocked that residents expressed this sentiment. They insisted
that the governmental response would have been of the same caliber
and at the same speed regardless of the impacted community.
According to one state official, this type of perception problem
is common in towns other than the historically monied towns in Rhode
Island.
How did these disconnects
occur?
It is clear that these contrasting perceptions, these disconnects
between officials and residents, largely occurred because of poor
or non-existent communication throughout the period of the contamination.
Communication between
officials and residents occurred in several ways:
- meetings, held during
town meetings and at special information meetings (handout
from 9/25/01 meeting)
- mailings,
issued twice (11/16/01 and 12/20/01) by HEALTH
- agency websites (see
state page under "Officials"
for links)
This, however, was not
enough. Many residents indicated that they received most of their
ongoing information during the water contamination event from other
sources, such as the media and informal means including word of
mouth. Since there were infrequent media briefings and no centralized
media point of contact, newspaper stories were sometimes contradictory
or not fully representative of the events.
The communication that
did occur did not satisfy resident needs. This communication problem
will be explored further in the ongoing project, but several issues
are outlined below.
- Though officials were
present at meetings and attempted to convey information to residents,
they did not adequately respond to community concerns.
- Mailings issued were
too infrequent and not at an appropriate level for comprehension.
- Information was often
available solely on the agency websites.
- There was no "point
person" for residents to contact with questions or concerns.
Other
Contributing Factors
Other factors that should
be examined as contributing to this disconnect include:
- Financial constraints.
At the beginning of the contamination event, it was difficult
to see where the tremendous sum of money required to ensure that
clean water would flow to Pascoag and to remediate the contaminated
site would come from. Agencies were understandably reluctant to
commit large sums of money, and the small size of the water supplier
dictated that the PUD would not have the financial resources necessary
to deal with contamination of this magnitude. Financial conservatism
also contributed to the choice of the temporary, smaller carbon
filtration system-officials didn't know if the system would be
effective, so they purchased the less expensive alternative. In
short, state officials said that they did not have a "big
bag of money" to spend on Pascoag. Residents, however, assumed
that the state would have the funding or the means to get the
funding to deal with the situation.
- State vs. local
politics. At
the local level, citizens and officials expressed the understanding
that with a problem this big and this expensive, the state and
state agencies would play a major role in dealing with the event.
However, officials at the state level almost unanimously viewed
contamination events as being under the jurisdiction of the water
supplier. This view does not mean that these agencies did not
play a major role in dealing with the Pascoag contamination; it
means that they often viewed themselves as going "beyond
the call of duty" in the time, effort, and financial resources
they contributed to dealing with the problem. State agencies were
also concerned with the precedent that would be set if state funding
went to "bail out" a private non-profit corporation
that serves only its ratepayers (the PUD).
- Organizational
cultures.The
state agencies who dealt with the contamination are regulatory
agencies, and they perceive their mission as regulators in a strict
sense: we heard mention of the "mandate" of the various
agencies, and the inability to act outside that proscribed mandate.
Their organizational culture confined their activities to those
for which precedent had been set and for which agency policies
had been clearly defined.
How
disconnect altered actions and behaviors
Residents did not understand officials' actions, and officials did
not understand residents' perceptions of them. Since neither side
understood the other, trust and confidence eroded. Many residents
explicitly stated that they no longer trust many public officials.
This was also expressed in their reported water uses: in April,
at the time of our interviews, 67% of respondents were
still not drinking the town water.
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