In 1993, Worcester, Massachusetts began a variable-rate solid-waste program in response to cuts in the city’s budget. Under the program, Worcester residents were required to purchase specially-marked garbage bags for fifty cents each. The revenue thus generated would be used to partially finance the cost of solid waste pick-up and disposal. Concurrently, the city started a new recycling program, which enabled residents to recycle more of their trash. City planners expected the amount of garbage produced in the city to decrease, thus reducing labor, hauling and disposal costs.

This thesis is an evaluation of Worcester’s variable-rate program. It explores the economic and political factors that caused Worcester to enact its program, and how these factors affected its design and implementation. It also analyzes how the program has impacted a segment of the population crucial to its success—namely, lower-income residents. It concludes by demonstrating how Worcester’s experience can provide guidance to other urban areas, particularly Providence, Rhode Island.

To determine the effectiveness of Worcester’s program, I used several methods. Quantitatively, I analyzed system costs before and after the program’s implementation. To evaluate its political effectiveness, I relied on qualitative methods—interviews with program designers and politicians, discussions with public servants and community activists, and archival research on the political and social factors that influenced the program’s design. In addition, I conducted two focus groups with low-income residents to determine their perceptions of the program, and its impact on their lives.

My findings indicate that Worcester’s unit-pricing program has been a success on several levels. It has achieved its primary goals—specifically, shifting the financial burden of solid-waste management away from the municipal budget, reducing solid-waste tonnage, and dramatically increasing recycling rates. It also seems to be a political success. Despite initial opposition, the planners’ ability to compromise resulted in a program largely accepted by lower-income residents. These compromises included maintaining an artificially low price for garbage bags, providing both large and small garbage bags, and widening the range of locations at which the garbage bags could be purchased. A public-outreach and education program has also helped alleviate the concerns of lower-income residents. Thanks to these measures, political opposition has been muted, and anticipated secondary effects, such as illegal dumping and non-compliance, have been negligible.

These findings suggest that Worcester’s program is a powerful model for other urban areas considering unit-pricing. Furthermore, it is a model that Providence, with its well-organized and vocal political opposition, would do well to emulate. By adopting a unit-pricing program, Providence can reap the financial and environmental benefits that Worcester has achieved. And by learning from Worcester’s experience, Providence can anticipate the political pitfalls and design a program that is both inclusive of and accepted by its lower-income residents.